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ABSTRACT 
 Network authentication between users is commonly performed through the 
process of exchanging cryptographic keys. However, this security practice could leave 
users vulnerable if an eavesdropper managed to ascertain these private keys and the 
manner that they are exchanged. As a result, alternative security methods can add new 
factors to uniquely authenticate trusted users and improve network security. Through 
signal multipath, previous research analyzed the time delay measurement between a 
channel tap’s indirect path from a physical reflector and that same channel tap’s direct, 
line-of-sight path to uniquely establish a stationary user’s identity to their physical 
position. Because these channel taps are dependent on the location of network users, an 
eavesdropper faces a difficult challenge to precisely imitate the same tap delay to gain 
unauthorized access. This thesis explores how tap delay measurements incrementally 
change as an authenticated user moves within a space. Through statistical analysis, our 
research aims to determine an acceptable tap delay interval that network users can use to 
track and maintain authentication for various speeds through a coverage area. 
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The next phase in wireless technologies, Fifth Generation (5G), promises to provide 
even higher data rates and lower latency to a wide variety of affordable and energy efficient 
devices. Recent projections forecast 3.5 billion users by 2026 as mobile subscribers switch 
from older generations to 5G [1]. Beyond furnishing telephone and data services to people 
with its enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), 5G also promises to make its unique, 
wireless contributions to other networks, such as Internet of Things (IoT), Internet of Skills 
(IoS), augmented reality (AR), virtual reality (VR) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) 
technologies. Introducing two additional categories of capabilities, 5G plans to extend its 
services beyond conventional cell phone coverage and into massive machine type 
communications (mMTC) and ultra-reliability low latency communications (URLLC). 
Service providers anticipate an additional 5 billion devices dedicated to machine-type 
communications linked to the 5G network by 2025 [2]. With the potential advancements 
in industry, transportation, and manufacturing sectors, it is unsurprising that the United 
States Department of Defense (DOD) is eager to explore new ways to modernize its own 
defense systems with the release of the “5G Strategy” in 2020 [3]. The DOD has already 
begun prototyping ground combat training with AR and VR, integrating wireless access to 
avionics for aircraft maintenance, and installing 5G into smart warehouses for efficient 
logistic support over the past year [4]. 
Research into innovative security practices is becoming increasingly important to 
meet the commercial and government demand for 5G access into their own technologies. 
As systems become more interconnected, this rapid materialization of simpler endpoint 
devices presents new challenges to security. To address the protection of data from wireless 
devices that are too constrained and resource-limited to perform more complex encryption 
algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has outlined its 
approved lightweight cryptography standards [5]. However, key-based cryptography, 
especially when it is adjusted for smaller devices, does not help strengthen the ability for a 
network to verify the identity of its sensors. Instead of authenticating a device by what it 
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possesses (like a key) or by what it knows (like an answer to a question), network users 
can inferentially confirm its devices by measuring the transmitted and received signal 
characteristics, which are harder for an attacker to imitate and gain unauthorized access. 
Unlike previous cellular technology, the communication link between 5G user 
equipment (UE) and service towers, called gNodeB (gNB), employs beamforming and 
multiple input multiple output (MIMO) technologies for the uplink and downlink channels 
[6]. Since these channels must be constantly monitored and physically adjusted to provide 
service for a moving UE, the network can use these channel characteristics to confirm the 
identity of a device by its physical position to receive cell service. Previous research in 
physical layer authentication has demonstrated that measuring the difference in time of 
arrival (TOA) between the reflected channel path and the line of sight (LOS) channel path 
of a signal in a multipath environment can act as a technique to verify the identity of 
network user [7]. Because the relative position of a transmitting device between a receiver 
and reflector causes this difference in TOA measurements, their location is the 
authenticating factor that establishes authorized access to network services. For an 
eavesdropper to gain unauthorized access to this physical channel between a gNB and UE, 
they would have to be physically standing in the same environment as their victim. 
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
For a UE that is moving in relation to a stationary reflector and a receiving gNB, 
the authentication measurement changes as the reflected and LOS distances of a signal vary 
based on position. To maintain track of the UE, the gNB can establish an interval around 
the most recent measurement based on what location the network anticipates the next delay 
measurement to occur. This thesis analyzes statistical data from multiple simulation runs 
to determine an appropriate interval size for a network to maintain authentication of a UE 
based on its speed and among other things, like competing UE devices also transmitting in 
the environment. 
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
We provide the background information and context from other research that 
established our assumptions and methods in Chapter II. We discuss our procedures to setup 
3 
and run simulations in Chapter III and analyze their results in Chapter IV. We conclude 
and summarize our research results and provide recommendations for future work in 
Chapter V. 
D. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Our research recommends networks use a tap-delay interval as a physical-layer 
authentication method to predict the next, expected tap-delay measurement to maintain 
authenticated status of its users. We statistically analyze the viability of this method as it 
relates to a transmitter physically moving at various ambulatory speeds through a multipath 
environment as well as with other signal transmissions producing their own channel taps 
that may interfere with this authentication practice. 
  
4 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides the necessary context as it relates to other research sources 
on the topic of 5G and physical-layer authentication, and it establishes our assumptions 
and initial setup for our simulations. 
A. PHYSICAL LAYER AUTHENTICATION 
Using the Open Systems Interconnected (OSI) Model, we can categorize the 
accessibility, security, or vulnerability of information as data moves within and between 
each of the seven layers as shown in Figure 1 based on [8]. The application layer is the 
highest, and its protocols are user-defined. The physical layer is the lowest, and its 
information flows functionally (mechanically or electrically). For 5G networks, one of the 
physical layers is the radiofrequency (RF) communication link between a UE and gNB. 
This is the physical layer that we focused on in our authentication simulations. 
 
Figure 1. OSI Model 
5G, like other networks, includes common information security services, such as 
data confidentiality, key management, availability, privacy, and authentication. Of these 
services, our research concentrated on authentication, which is defined as the verification 
of identity to allow authorized network access. To demonstrate an example of a 5G network 
physical layer authentication, [9] illustrates the 5G core as a software defined network 
(SDN) that uses weighed secure-context-information (SCI) transfers to perform 
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authenticated hand-offs of a user between gNB. SCI is a non-cryptographic authentication 
method that efficiently supports frequent handovers between different cells. Rather than 
have network entities spend time using key-based authentication and potentially delaying 
service as a user moves between cells, SCI keeps authentication without entities needing 
to compute complex algorithms. The SDN watches and anticipates the user physical 
location to the next applicable gNB base stations are ready to receive the user through full 
authentication on larger gNB or via fast authentication on smaller access points (AP), as 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. SDN-enabled secure-context-information transfer between 
5G UE, APs, and AM in SDN controller. Source: [10]. 
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The information about a user contained in SCI can be any information that is unique 
to the UE that the 5G network is providing service to, such as any physical-layer 
measurements, its location, its speed, or its direction. The authors in [11] proposed a user-
SCI-based authentication handover algorithm, where the 5G SDN controller implements 
an authentication handover module (AHM) that predicts user movement and prepares cells 
in advance to provide seamless service while maintaining authenticated status of that user 
to the network. An example of a user-SCI-based authentication algorithm is provided in 
Figure 3, where cell A has authenticated user U, which is traveling towards coverage areas 
of cells B and C. The SDN controller employs the AHM to inform cells B and C of the 
identity and SCI of user U prior to its arrival to their service areas. Cells A and B perform 
a handoff with user U, and then cell B authenticates user U with the SCI received from the 
SDN via the AHM. B confirms U with its SCI from A, and then B updates the SDN 
controller with the new U SCI via the AHM with current locational, speed, or direction 
information. Cell C continues to monitor U as it stays in the service area of B. 
 
Figure 3. User-SCI-based authentication handover. Source: [11]. 
This user-SCI-based authentication handover method illustrates one way that a 5G 
network can establish and maintain physical layer authentication without having to use 
key-based cryptography. The network monitors measurements and data that are only 
unique to its users, which makes imitation of these metrics impossible for an eavesdropper 
or attacker. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The user-SCI-based authentication method and algorithm covered in the earlier 
section is only an example of physical layer security in a 5G network. There is a multitude 
of published research about physical layer security in a 5G network as it applies to 
authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity. The authors in [12]–[14] perform their 
own in-depth surveys of papers on the subject and reveal the constraints of implementing 
physical-security methods in wireless networks.  
Most of the constraints on physical layer security impact how a 5G network can 
guarantee its information is kept confidential. Multiple-antenna technology for MIMO and 
the multiple channels that are induced from a multipath environment make digital network 
coding a dynamic process. This inconsistent variability in the physical layer presents a 
challenge to employ key-based cryptography and provide confidentiality, when a key is 
designed to encrypt or decipher a set size of information between a transmitter and receiver. 
These confidentiality challenges to physical-layer security do not play as much of a role in 
authentication, unless a network relies on keys being securely exchanged to confirm 
identity. 
In terms of physical-layer authentication, the literature is concerned about security 
vulnerabilities that can allow an attacker to impersonate or imitate credentials that are not 
their own. For instance, a network receiver can develop its own library of RF fingerprints 
associated to devices that wirelessly access its service [15]. RF fingerprints are not 
deliberately designed into devices like RF identification (RFID) that we commonly 
experience with hotel keys or security badges that we use to unlock a door without a 
physical key. Instead, RF fingerprints seem to be more authentic and less imitable than 
RFID because the identifier is based on manufacturing or design imperfections 
unintentionally unique to the way a device transmits information. However, [16] 
demonstrates how an attacker can record and reuse RF fingerprints from other devices to 
steal their credentials with a man-on-the-side (MOTS) attack as illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Wireless MOTS targeting RF fingerprint authentication. 
Source: [15]. 
Instead of RF fingerprinting, a network could use channel state information (CSI) 
instead as an authentication method. CSI is the shared information to assist both UE and 
gNB in making energy efficient decisions in uplink and downlink channel selection. Since 
this information is unique between a UE and a gNB, then reasonably CSI could be a 
physical-layer authentication method. However, [17] demonstrates a pilot-spoof attack that 
interferes with a device performing channel estimation. Since the pilot signals are 
repeatedly broadcast and are known to the public, an eavesdropper can act like a local gNB 
and broadcast the same pilot signal to a victim UE and interfere with their ability to perform 
channel estimation. This shows a vulnerability when a UE authenticates the identity of a 
servicing gNB based on CSI when an attacker can imitate the same pilot signal as seen in 
Figure 5, where Eve, who is a single-antenna attacker, is imitating Bob, who is the real 
single-antenna network provider. Meanwhile, Alice is equipped with multiple antennas and 
is trying to authenticate, who the real network provider is between Bob and Eve. This 
scenario illustrates how an attacker can imitate the CSI in the pilot signal without another 
mechanism to authenticate an attacker from the actual network. This thesis does 
recommend a solution to this vulnerability, where Alice employs an energy ratio detector 
(ERD), which indicates higher than normal energy level for a pilot signal when Eve is 
transmitting with Bob.  
10 
 
Figure 5. Eve imitates Bob’s signaling to a vulnerable Alice. Source: 
[17]. 
In summary, this section showed how physical-layer security is a diverse subject 
for technical research and presents vulnerabilities and recommendations on how a wireless 
5G network can improve its security practices. Of the security functions in the physical 
layer, our review shows that there is more information addressing confidentiality than 
authentication methods. We explored some examples on how a network can use pre-
existing information that is normally shared as a means of authentication, such as RF 
fingerprinting the transmission from a device or using the parameters contained in CSI, to 
uniquely associate one entity from another. This review of the technical literature 
establishes what methods have already been explored on the subject of physical-layer 
security and substantiates the originality of our proposed authentication method discussed 
in the upcoming sections. 
C. CHANNEL TAP DELAY FOR PHYSICAL LAYER AUTHENTICATION 
In a multipath environment, a single, transmitted signal can be received multiple 
times at varying power levels based off the multiple paths this signal takes, as demonstrated 
in [18]. The power of these received taps can be plotted over time as a power-delay-line 
profile. An example of what this profile looks like is shown in Figure 6, where the paths 
for all the single-bounce reflections (SBR) caused by physical reflectors arrive at a receiver 
with varying power levels at varying times.  
11 
 
Figure 6. Power-delay-line profile of a 28 GHz signal caused by 
reflectors. Source: [18]. 
By using a power-delay-line profile, we can calculate the channel-tap delay, which 
is the amount of time that a reflected signal reaches a receiver subtracted by the same signal 
LOS path to the same receiver. Figure 7 is a simpler example of power-delay-line profile 
to illustrate some information that we can derive from this type of plot. The peak amplitude 
occurs with the first and earliest signal tap (τ1). Because this signal takes a direct path, it 
does not experience as much path loss as the next, detected tap (τ2) of the same signal that 
travels its longer, reflected path [19]. The tap delay (Δτ) is the time between the earliest 
signal and the next detectable tap from the same signal.  
12 
 
Figure 7. Simpler example of a power-delay-line profile 
Let us assume that we surveyed our physical environment and found a large object 
with material that can reliably reflect a signal tap from a transmitter to the receiver for a 
wide range of locations in our environment. Let us also assume that for every tap from this 
large reflector, the receiver can also reliably detect the LOS path of the tap directly from 
the transmitter in this environment. If we can identify and filter out any other non-line-of-
sight (NLOS) signal paths caused by other reflectors within our environment, then we can 
calculate tap delay without having to use a power-delay-line profile. We can measure the 
LOS distance (dLOS) using Pythagorean theorem and the NLOS distance (dNLOS) from the 
reflector using both Pythagorean theorem and Snell’s law, where the incident angle on a 
reflector will equal the reflected angle. By taking the difference of these two distances and 
dividing it by the signal propagation speed represented by the speed of light (c), we can 





 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 = 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑐𝑐
. (2.1) 
Since the NLOS and LOS distances are dependent on the location of the transmitter 
relative to both the location and orientation of the large reflector and the location of the 
receiver, this tap-delay measurement can act as a measure of authentication. Because it is 
associated to the transmitter position in the environment, this measurement is difficult to 
imitate by an eavesdropper without physically being co-located with the transmitter. 
Previous research in [20] demonstrates that this is an effective authentication method that 
easily distinguishes an actual entity from an imitator in the same, physical environment. 
The author of [20] also provides another equation to calculate the tap delay using 
scalar values in a Cartesian grid. In this equation, the line-of-sight distance between 
transmitter and receiver is dLOS.  The receiver and the transmitter both have their own 
closest point of approach (CPA) distances to the large reflecting plane. Both of these CPA 
distances are indicated as hRx and hTx. We can then calculate the difference of these CPA 
distances with Δh = hTx – hRx. We can divide all of the distance computations by the speed 






 . (2.2) 
This tap-delay equation is used for our simulations, setup in Chapter III, where the 
positions of our transmitter (𝒑𝒑𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻) and receiver (𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑻𝑻) with the position (𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒓) and orientation 
(𝒏𝒏) of the reflector are given in Cartesian-vector format. Figure 8 shows how these 
locational values are physically arranged to calculate the tap delay, where hTx and hRx are 
the CPA distances between 𝒑𝒑𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 R and 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑻𝑻 R and the reflector, respectively. 
14 
 
Figure 8. Illustration of specular reflector geometry. Source: [20]. 
D. TAP-DELAY INTERVAL TO AUTHENTICATE A MOVING USER 
Bearing some similarities with [9]–[11], we propose a method to continue to use 
tap-delay measurements as a means of physical layer authentication for a user moving at 
pedestrian speeds. A network can theoretically maintain authenticated track of a moving 
transmitter by setting up a tap-delay interval (±δΔτ) around its most recent, authenticated 
tap-delay measurement (Δτn) of a transmitter. If the next tap-delay measurement (Δτn+1) is 
inside this tap-delay interval, then the transmitter maintains its authenticated status on the 
network. However, if the next tap-delay measurement (Δτn+1) is outside the tap-delay 
interval (±δΔτ), as shown in Figure 9, then the transmitter loses its authenticated status and 
must re-authenticate to the network. 
15 
 
Figure 9. Example of a tap delay calculated outside of tap-delay 
interval 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the requisite background and context to our research and 
proposed physical-layer authentication method for a moving user. At a high level, we 
classified the term “physical-layer authentication.” We performed a literature review on 
physical-layer security as it relates to wireless 5G networks to see what research has already 
revealed in vulnerabilities and recommended security precautions. Based on our review, 
we investigated a new method that relates tap-delay calculations to authenticate entities 
based on their physical position. This tap-delay calculation will be used as we evaluate a 
way to maintain authentication of a transmitting device that is moving in a simulated 
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III. SIMULATION  
To understand how a network can maintain authentication of a moving user in a 
space with a planar reflector that enables multipath measurements, the proceeding 
simulations are designed to answer the following questions:  
1. What is the expected range of values for channel-tap delays (Δτ) for a 
pedestrian walking through our simulated environment at different speeds? 
2. When we take the difference of one channel-tap delay value from the next 
(δΔτ), what is the range of values for δΔτ as a transmitter moves through 
the environment, and how much does it change based on a pedestrian’s 
speed? 
3.  What is the probability that a network can maintain authentication of a 
pedestrian based on its tap-delay interval size? 
4. If a network pre-selects a threshold value for its tap-delay interval to 
maintain authentication of a pedestrian, what is the probability that a 
network can maintain track of its user with other pedestrians transmitting 
in the same test environment? 
This chapter focuses on the setup for each of these simulations while analysis of 
the results will be discussed in the proceeding chapter. 
A. TAP-DELAY MEASUREMENTS OF A USER IN MOTION 
For this portion of the experiment, we set up a virtual test environment with a planar 
reflector, and two authenticated entities, named Alice and Bob. Alice is using Bob’s 
network and is moving in a specified direction at a constant speed. Bob is stationary and 
wants to maintain Alice’s authenticated status by measuring her position based on the time 
delay between her channel taps. It is assumed that Bob either knows or can obtain four 
values to calculate Alice’s channel tap delay, which are Alice’s position vector (𝒑𝒑𝑨𝑨), Bob’s 
position vector (𝒑𝒑𝑩𝑩), the vector location of the planar reflector (𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒓), and the orientation of 
the reflector represented by its normal vector (𝒏𝒏). With this information Bob can calculate 
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Alice’s tap delay for any of her positions in the environment using the tap-delay equation 
(2.2). 
To introduce some realism to our simulations, our virtual environment did not 
exceed 200 meters to resemble a millimeter-wave (mmWave) 5G cellular coverage area in 
an urban location. Likewise, we kept Alice’s height at 1 meter to represent someone 
walking with their UE, and Bob’s height at 15 meters to resemble gNB. These 
measurement decisions are based on the research done in New York City discussed in [21]. 
We took tap-delay measurements for Alice moving at 1 m/s (approximately 2.24 mph), and 
again for Alice for moving at 5 m/s (approximately 5 mph). 
We randomly assigned a Cartesian coordinate position and direction for Alice to 
start moving at one of these constant speeds. We also randomly assigned a Cartesian 
coordinate position for Bob to stand and measure Alice’s channel tap delays as she moves 
in relation to him on the same side of a planar reflector. A single trial involves Alice 
walking a distance in ten seconds. Bob will take a channel tap-delay measurement on 
Alice’s position every second, so that he will have ten tap-delay measurements for Alice’s 
single walk-by trial. We will repeat this trial 100,000 times to survey for all the possible 
channel tap delays in this environment for both speeds. Performing this many simulations 
will reveal the maximum and minimum channel tap delays Alice can have in this 
environment, and the data can also be statistically analyzed to see how frequently Alice’s 
channel tap delay lands on certain values over others. 
B. TAP-DELAY DIFFERENTIAL MEASUREMENTS 
The term, tap-delay differential, is the difference between a current channel tap-
delay measurement taken at some time, n, compared to the previous channel tap-delay 
measurement for the same user from n-1, which is represented by 
 𝛿𝛿𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 =  𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛 − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛−1. (3.1) 
Since a channel-tap delay is related to user location, the difference from one 
sequential measurement to the next can act as a scalar indicator of distance and direction 
for a moving user, based on their speed and how frequently a network calculates channel- 
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tap delays. The tap-delay differential can help establish the tap-delay interval around the 
most recent tap-delay measurement, where the network would expect the next tap delay 
from their moving user to maintain their authentication. 
In this set of simulations, we incrementally increased Alice’s speed by 1 m/s at a 
time from 1 to 5 m/s to see how much the range of tap-delay differential values change for 
each of her speeds. Like the tap-delay measurements in the previous simulation, we ran 
100,000 trials for each of Alice’s speed increments. The deliverables for this set of 
simulations are histograms for her slowest and fastest speeds as well as a table of results 
reporting the approximate range of maximum and minimum values of the tap-delay 
differentials for each of her five speeds. 
C. TAP-DELAY DIFFERENTIAL PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 
FUNCTION FOR DIFFERENT SPEEDS 
Based on the tap-delay differential results from the previous simulation, Bob has a 
range of tap-delay differential values to inform his tap-delay interval to keep a moving 
Alice authenticated to his network. To determine the probability of positively detecting 
Alice’s next tap-delay position based on Bob’s selection of a tap-delay differential 
threshold, we characterized the tap-delay differential results with a probability distribution 
function (PDF). For these simulations, we varied Alice’s speed from 1 to 5 m/s 
incrementing by 1 m/s for each simulation. We then fit a PDF curve based on the tap-delay 
differential results for each of these simulations. This information answers the third 
question posed at the beginning of this chapter. 
D. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION VERSUS FALSE ALARM 
This final set of simulations presented other channel tap delays that occur 
coincidentally with Alice’s tap delays but are not Alice. At any point in time, Bob has two 
tap delays to consider; one is Alice, and the other is not Alice. For simplicity, we considered 
these other tap delays belonging to a benign actor named, Carol. She is considered benign 
because she is not deliberately trying to interfere with Bob’s ability to accurately 
authenticate Alice. Rather, Carol only exists in the same coverage area as Alice, and Bob 
can confuse Carol’s tap delays from Alice’s.  
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After the first set of simulations earlier in this chapter, we have an idea of what the 
maximum tap delay is for our coverage area. From this, we can randomize Carol’s tap 
delay to be any value between the tap-delay maximum and zero. Bob must calculate two, 
unknown tap-delay differentials (δΔτ1 and δΔτ2) without knowing which of the measured 
tap delays belongs to Alice (Δτn,Alice) or Carol (Δτn,Carol). Bob only remembers Alice’s last 
measured tap delay (Δτn-1,Alice). The first unknown tap delay differential is 
 𝛿𝛿𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥1 =  𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛−1,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴  (3.2) 
and the second unknown tap delay differential is 
 𝛿𝛿𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥2 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛−1,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴  (3.3) 
If Alice’s tap delay falls within his established tap-delay interval for her, then Bob 
calls a positive detection for Alice. There is a chance that Carol’s tap delay can cause her 
to fall inside Alice’s tap-delay interval, and Bob will confuse Carol for Alice. 
Alice randomly walks in different directions with Bob measuring her tap delay, like 
we have done in the previous simulations, and Bob calculates Carol’s tap-delay 
measurements as she walks around the same environment. We kept a normalized tally of 
every time Bob correctly detected Alice based on the difference between her current and 
previous positions, and we kept a normalized tally of every time Bob incorrectly detected 
Carol for Alice. We incrementally swept Bob’s tap-delay interval size for Alice from zero 
to the maximum tap-delay differential. 
We plotted receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves to display the 
relationship between the probability of positive detection (Pd) versus the probability of 
false alarm (PFA) as we incrementally increase the width of the tap-delay interval. We 
overlaid ROC curves for each speed of Alice from 1 to 5 m/s to see how her speed impacts 
the relationship between probability of detection and false alarm. This illustrates the 
balance Bob must strike, when selecting a tap-delay interval width. While he may opt to 
select the maximum possible threshold to guarantee tracking Alice’s tap delay every time, 
a large interval also means that he is more likely to confuse Carol for Alice. Instead, Bob 
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must select an interval size that is wide enough to have a high probability of detection for 
Alice’s tap delay but is narrow enough to avoid false alarms for Carol. 
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we identified four questions to consider, when a network wants to 
maintain authentication of a user moving in their coverage area using multipath channel 
tap delays caused by a physical reflector in the area. Then we designed simulations to 
obtain results to help us address these questions in Chapter IV. 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Now that we have setup our simulation environment to answer the questions posed 
in Chapter III, the results of these simulations help us better understand how to track a 
network user with their channel tap delay to maintain their network authentication within 
a small service coverage area. The Monte Carlo simulations used no less than 100,000 trials 
to generate the plots below. 
A. TAP-DELAY MEASUREMENTS OF A PEDESTRIAN MOVING AT 
DIFFERENT SPEEDS 
To determine expected range of tap-delay values for our simulated environment, 
Figure 10 is a histogram plot of Bob’s tap-delay measurements of Alice, when she moved 
through our simulated environment at 1 m/s. Bob measured Alice’s tap delay ten times for 
each walk-by trial. Since we performed 100,000 trials, we have a total of 1,000,000 tap-
delay measurements. By selecting a uniform, 5-nanosecond bin size, we can incrementally 
tally of all 1,000,000 tap-delay measurements into each of these bins from zero to the 
maximum tap-delay value. This helps us visualize how frequently some values occurred 
compared to others. Most of Alice’s tap-delay measurements occur near zero, and the 
number of occurrences for each bin of values declines as the tap-delay value increases.  
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Figure 10. Tap-delay measurements for Alice moving at 1 m/s 
Figure 11 is a histogram plot of Bob’s tap-delay measurements for Alice moving 
through our simulated environment at 5 m/s, which looks like Figure 10. Most of Alice’s 
tap-delay measurements occur near zero, and there are fewer occurrences each, five-
nanosecond bin of tap-delay values as it increases from zero to the maximum recorded tap-
delay value for Alice. 
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Figure 11. Tap-delay measurements for Alice moving at 5 m/s 
Table 1 reports the minimum and maximum tap-delay values for Alice moving at 
her different speeds. 







1 0 639 
5 0 660 
 
For both of Alice’s speeds, the tap-delay measurement is never negative. This 
makes sense because we are subtracting the distance of the NLOS path from the distance 
of the LOS path and then dividing that distance by the speed of light to calculate channel’s 
tap. A negative tap delay value is not possible, because the reflected path will always be 
26 
longer than the LOS path. The lowest possible tap delay is zero, and that would occur only 
when Alice presses her UE against the reflector to get an equal NLOS path and LOS path. 
Alice’s maximum tap delay for her speed at 5 m/s is about 21 nanoseconds greater 
than when she moves at 1 m/s. Although this difference in maximum values appears small, 
Alice will travel 40 more meters in ten seconds at her top speed than she would at 1 m/s. 
B. TAP-DELAY DIFFERENTIAL MEASUREMENTS OF A PEDESTRIAN 
MOVING AT DIFFERENT SPEEDS 
Figure 12 is a histogram of Alice’s tap-delay differential values for her slowest 
speed of 1 m/s. The range of values is symmetrically balanced over the y-axis with the 
extrema being ± 6.6 nanoseconds. 
  
Figure 12. Tap-delay differential measurements for Alice moving at 1 
m/s 
Figure 13 is a histogram of Alice’s tap-delay differential values. The range of 
values is also symmetric over the y-axis with the extrema being ±33.2 nanoseconds. 
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Figure 13. Tap-delay differential measurements for Alice moving at 5 
m/s 







1 -6.62 6.63 
2 -13.2 13.3 
3 -19.9 19.9 
4 -26.5 26.5 
5 -33.2 33.1 
 
Figures 12 and 13 have similar shapes, but Alice’s increased speed has broadened 
the tap-delay differential range from ± 6.63 nanoseconds to ±33.2 nanoseconds. these 
simulations were incrementally re-run varying Alice’s speed from 1 to 5 m/s, to calculate 
the maximum tap-delay differentials in Table 2. Characterizing the extrema for Alice’s 
various speeds is important for later simulations when Bob has to select a tap-delay 
differential threshold in order to positively detect Alice from one tap delay to the next. 
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The information from the simulations in this part of Chapter IV answers the first 
two questions presented in Chapter III. We determined the expected range of values for 
channel tap delays (Δτ) for a pedestrian walking through our simulated environment to 
range from 0 to 660 nanoseconds. We also learned that these tap delay values are dependent 
on Alice’s position in the simulated environment, and that her slowest and fastest speeds 
had little impact on the maximum tap delays. This section also revealed the range of values 
for channel tap-delay differentials (δΔτ) and how much they change based on Alice’s speed. 
C. PDF CURVES TO CHARACTERIZE TAP-DELAY DIFFERENTIALS 
Based on the shape of the histograms for Alice’s channel tap-delay differentials 
values, we chose to use an exponential PDF to characterize the data. Even though an 
exponential PDF is not a perfect representation of our data, which has a clear stopping 
point at approximately 33 nanoseconds, this PDF fit is simple to calculate and for a network 
to implement, when creating a tap-delay interval. We took the absolute value of all the tap-
delay differential values from the previous simulation, so that they are all positive and we 
fit an exponential PDF over that data using the following equation 
 ƒ(𝑥𝑥; 𝜆𝜆) =  � 𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒
−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆      𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0
   0              𝑥𝑥 < 0   
. (4.1) 
We calculated the mean (μ) of the absolute value of the tap-delay differential 
measurements for each of Alice’s speeds to obtain rate parameter (λ), which is the inverse 
of the mean (μ) as seen in Table 3. 
Table 3. Parameters for tap-delay differential exponential PDFs 
Speed (m/s) Mean δΔτ (nanoseconds) Rate Parameter (λ) (s-1) 
1 2.02 4.94x108 
2 3.02 3.31x108 
3 3.99 2.51x108 
4 4.91 2.04x108 
5 5.80 1.724x108 
 
29 
The exponential PDFs for Alice’s various speeds, shown in Figure 14, provide 
insight to answering the third question posed in Chapter III. To maintain authentication of 
a pedestrian, Bob can create a tap-delay interval size and compare it to the PDF plot or take 
the integral from zero to his selected interval maximum value of the exponential PDF 
equation corresponding to Alice’s speed. From this, he can determine the probability of 
maintaining authenticated track of Alice from one second to the next. For instance, if Bob 
selected a tap-delay interval that is ± 5 nanoseconds-wide for Alice moving at 1 m/s, Figure 
14 reveals a lot of area under the exponential curve from zero to 5 nanoseconds. Taking 
the integral of the exponential PDF equation for Alice moving at 1 m/s, more precisely 
reveals that Bob has a 91.5% chance of maintaining authentication of Alice. Going deeper, 
if Alice decides to start running and Bob keeps his 5-nanosecond threshold, the integral of 
the 4 m/s exponential PDF indicates that Bob now has a 58.5% chance of maintaining 
Alice’s authentication. Therefore, Bob is needs to increase his tap-delay interval width to 
raise his chances of keeping Alice authenticated based on her position. 
 
Figure 14. Exponential PDF of tap-delay differentials for various 
speeds 
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D. ROC CURVES: PROBABILITY OF DETECTION VERSUS FALSE 
ALARM 
Referring to Figures 10 and 11 of Alice’s tap-delay measurements in our first 
simulation, it is realistic to model Carol as another transmitter with a random start point 
and direction (like Alice). This causes Bob to have to measure Carol’s tap delays and 
compare them to Alice’s tap-delay interval. 
For our first simulation, Carol walks around our virtual environment like Alice 
does, and Bob must measure and compare both of their tap-delay measurements to keep 
Alice authenticated. We increased the tap-delay interval width for Alice in 100-picosecond 
increments from 0 to 33 nanoseconds, which is the maximum tap-delay differential that we 
saw when Alice moves at 5 m/s in the results of the earlier simulations. We measured the 
positive detections of Alice versus false alarms caused by Carol’s tap-delay measurements 
landing in Alice’s tap-delay interval for each increment and the different speeds for Alice 
to produce the ROC curves in Figures 15. Based on the ROC Curve, Alice’s 100% 
authentication occurs with a minimum probability of false alarm ranging from 11% to 32% 
depending on Alice’s speed.  
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Figure 15. ROC curve: Carol randomly walks around with Alice 
To add more realism to our simulations, there could be more people walking in 
vicinity of Alice than just Carol. In this final simulation, we modeled two more moving 
transmitters, Dennis and Frank, and then plotted a ROC curve based on three transmitters. 
To maintain Alice’s authenticated status as she moves around the environment, Bob is 
going to have to compare the tap-delay measurements of Alice, Carol, Dennis, and Frank 
to Alice’s tap-delay interval. Because there are more people in this environment, the ROC 
curve in Figure 16 shows more degradation between the probability of detection and false 
alarm. For Alice to maintain her authenticated status based on her tap-delay measurement 
100% of the time, the network will have to accept a probability of false alarm ranging from 
34% to 98% based on Alice’s speed as shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 16. ROC curve: three other users walking around with Alice 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter produced plots and metrics based on the simulation methodology set 
out in Chapter III. With the information that we gathered from these simulations; we were 
able to answer the questions that we posed to evaluate how well Bob can maintain 
authentication of Alice as she moves in an environment with a reflector. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis built from previous research that demonstrated that a network could 
improve its authentication mechanisms beyond common cryptologic practices by linking a 
network user identity to their physical location based on a tap-delay measurement in a 
multipath environment. However, when an authenticated user begins to move in this 
environment with a reflector, the network would have to reauthenticate and calculate their 
new channel tap delay when they eventually stop moving. As discussed in Chapter II, 
authentication processes can be cumbersome depending on the physical-layer-security 
practices of the network.  
We proposed a way that a network can maintain authentication of its moving users 
by establishing a tap-delay interval around the most recent measurement of a moving 
target. By correctly anticipating when the next tap delay will occur, a network will not have 
to reauthenticate its users in motion as often. We analyzed how a pedestrian’s speed from 
a slow walk to a sprint can impact the size of this tap-delay interval, which demands that 
the network must dynamically tailor its interval size to ensure successful tracking of their 
authenticated user, while also preventing false alarm detection from other users’ tap-delay 
measurements. We showed through ROC curve analysis that other users randomly moving 
within an environment can cause their tap-delay measurements to interfere with a network 
maintaining authenticated status of its users. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
To improve and validify this physical-layer authentication method, we recommend 
further tests in an environment with a live 5G network to address some of our assumptions, 
specifically presuppositions that we made with our reflector. 
1. Reflector Dimensions 
For our simulations, we assumed a reflector with infinite dimensions. This 
guaranteed that every transmitted signal had a NLOS path to the receiver from the reflector. 
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Realistically, a reflector with limited dimensions can impact the ability to measure the 
delay between channel taps when a transmitter is at a location, where the reflector cannot 
produce a NLOS signal path back to the authenticating receiver. Also, our research does 
not explore how edge diffraction can cause signals to propagate back to a receiver to 
calculate their channel tap delay.  
2. Reflector Material 
Our research also assumes that the material of the simulated reflector perfectly 
reflects energy from the transmitter to the receiver. We do not take into consideration what 
materials a real reflector must have to reliably reflect channel taps back without absorption. 
Additional research into materials that reliably reflect 5G energy can help improve this 
authentication method. 
3. Other Reflectors 
Finally, our simulation assumed that there was only one reflector in our test 
environment. An environment with many reflectors can interfere with the ability to 
calculate the delay between channel taps. Other reflectors may obstruct and shadow signal 
propagation to the reflector. 
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